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Resistance to new technology and its
effects on nuclear power, information
technology and biotechnology
MARTIN BAUER
Basic questions
The word 'resistance' has become unsuitable for use in the context of new
technology. The allegation is that it serves mainly to blame those who resist;
talking about resistance implies a managerial and technocratic bias. However, in
developing the idea for this conference, I was confident that 'resistance' would
prove ambiguous in meaning and rich in connotations, particularly in the
European context.1
Historians of technology recently rediscovered 'resistance' as a 'force' that
shapes technology which requires an adequate analysis (Mokyr 1990,1992). For
the economist resistance is basically the vested interests of old capital in ideas,
skills and machinery. In addition, in the light of the critique of the 'Whiggish'
historiography of technology (Staudenmaier 1985), it seems reasonable to lift
' resistance' from the dustbin of history.
Artefacts such as machines, power stations, computers, telephones, broad-
casts and genetically engineered tomatoes, and the practice of their production,
handling, marketing and use - in other words, technological innovations - are
not the only factors of historical change. Technological determinism seems an
inadequate account of our history. Various social activities give form to processes
and products, facilitate their diffusion and mitigate their consequences. However,
technology is not neutral. It creates opportunities and simultaneously constrains
human activity. We experience the latter as being paced by 'machines' rather
than controlling them. The selection of options is not neutral; it is likely to be
contested and in need of legitimation. The control of technology by those affected
by it remains a desirable agenda. From here the disagreement begins: who should
be accountable to whom, and which procedures ensure this accountability ?
In this context it constitutes a challenge to reflect on the concepts of resistance,
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and to review historical events, in order to rehabilitate the notion. In my view this
may be achieved by analysing resistance in terms of its various consequences.
This means starting with a functional hypothesis, instead of assuming a priori
dysfunctional consequences of resistance for the' progress' of society. Here we are
less interested in the causes of resistance than in its effects. Resistance as the
' enemy of progress' is only a part of the story, as we will see, both historically and
for more recent events.
Methodologically resistance to new technology is as much an independent as
it is a dependent variable: the public reaction to technology influences new
technology in a circular process. The study of resistance is located halfway
between traditional impact analysis and the recent focus on socio-technical
networking of humans and artefacts (Latour 1988; in German, Technikgenese:
e.g. Joerges 1989).
The term 'resistance' elicits contradictory connotations. It seems necessary to
justify an academic contribution on 'resistance' because the term is loaded with
a managerial and modernisation bias and is not suitable for an impartial analysis
of social events.2 A participant at the conference put it bluntly: resistance implies
a 'whitewash of big industry' in technological controversies. The term 'resist-
ance' elicits quite different connotations. Traditions of philosophical thinking
give resistance a moral dignity; and events of the twentieth century impute
'resistance' (Widerstand, resistence, resistenza) with an aura of 'heroism' in the
struggle against totalitarianism. In South America 500 years of colonialism give
it the ' heroic' meaning of fighting a lost cause that may finally prevail. We may
deal with a real cultural difference in semantics.
The managerial and technocratic discourse stipulates resistance as a structural
or a personal deficit. Resistance is irrational, morally bad, or at best under-
standable but futile. In contrast, the German discussion of new technology since
the 1970s has been conducted under the term 'acceptance crisis'; the debate
carefully avoids the term ' resistance', which is reserved for the respectable part of
the national identity for which post-war historians, not only in Germany, have
fought (Schmadeke & Steinbach 1985).
Because of these semantic confusions authors have argued that the term be
dropped. I disagree, and suggest that we keep the term and stress the intended
meaning. The ambiguity of the term 'resistance' allows us to ask different
questions about an old problem of social change. This volume provides a review
of the notions of resistance in technological controversies. The nineteen
contributions compare forms and effects of resistance across time, space and
technology: from machine breaking and technology transfer in the nineteenth
century, Fordism in the early twentieth century, to three base technologies
after 1945: civil nuclear power, information technology, and new biotechnology.
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The comparison is done, naturally, using different approaches. The scope of
material is limited geographically. The technological processes in countries of the
Far East, in China, Taiwan and Japan are excluded; equally excluded are
countries of the Third World and of Eastern Europe, where the problem of
resistance to new technology may have a different angle altogether. These
chapters mark the ambitious beginnings of an attempt to map intellectual
territory: to study the contributions of resistance to the ' progress' of technology.
In the following I elaborate the rationale that brought contributors together to
address the following key questions:
What are the forms of resistance ?
What is being resisted?
Who are the resistant actors?
What are the effects of resistance ?
What are the (dis)analogies between technologies ?
The concept of 'resistance': towards a functional analysis?
My own theoretical inclination is towards a functional analysis of resistance by
its consequences in a wider context. We do better to study functions of a process
first, and to study dysfunctions afterwards as a dynamic aberration of normal
processes. To date we have assumed the dysfunctions and neglected the functions
of resistance to new technology. My framework draws upon recent developments
in the theory of autonomous systems and elaborates a functional analogy,
between resistance and acute pain with reference to processes of self-monitoring.
Metaphorically speaking, resistance is the 'acute pain' of the innovation process.
I cannot assume that contributors subscribe to this framework, so I put it at the
end of the book in an attempt to summarize. I develop this framework which both
stimulated the idea of the book, and, I dare to hope, embraces many of the issues
in a coherent manner. The core thesis states:
Resistance affects socio-technical activity like acute pain affects individual processes':
it is a signal that something is going wrong; it reallocates attention and enhances self-
awareness ; it evaluates ongoing activity; and it alters this activity in various ways to
secure a sustainable future.
Three base technologies after 1945
Someone interested in contemporary history might ask: why compare nuclear
power, information technology, and biotechnology? The automobile and space
technology are equally major technological innovations of the twentieth century.3
There are several reasons for the focus on these three technologies. The choice
depends on the frame of comparison or 'tertium comparationis'.
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.197.39 on Wed Jan 04 15:41:15 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511563706.002
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
Martin Bauer
Table 1.1 Invention, innovations and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) attention
Technology Invention Innovation OECD attention
Nuclear
Information
technology
Biotechnology
1942 first nuclear
chain reaction
1943 ENIAC
1947 transistor
1959 integrated
circuit
1959 micro
processor
1944 DNA
1947 double helix
1973 rDNA
1955-6 first
nuclear power
stations (USSR, UK)
1954 commercial
1961 commercial
1965 micro
computer
1975 home
computer
1981 IBM PC
1975 CETUS US
1977 BIOGEN
(Europe)
companies
founded
1956 first report
1960 micro
1965 office
automat
1971 IT policy
series
1979 new IT
series
1982 first report
Sources: OECD publications catalogue; Wright, 1986; Riidig, 1990.
Similarities
Five similarities of nuclear power, information technology, and biotechnology
suggest a viable comparison. I am using these technologies generically as clusters
of innovations that are distinct objects of R & D policy, planning and public
perceptions.
First, economic historians suggest a periodization of time since about 1780 in
cycles of roughly 50 years, commonly known as 'long waves' or 'Kondratieff
cycles' of the world economy. Each upswing is based on the scientific and
technical ideas developed during the previous downswing for which capital
becomes available in the new upswing. Evidence indicates that the fourth wave
turned into the downswing in the early 1970s, and a fifth long cycle may have
taken off since.4 The technologies commonly associated with this hypothetical
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fifth upswing are civil nuclear power, the new source of energy; microelectronics,
with its ramifications into computer and communication technology, the new
form of communication (Freeman 1985; DeGreene 1988; Ayers 1990); and
biotechnology and genetic engineering, the new forms of food production, animal
breeding and medical care. Resistance to new technology can take the form of
social movements. Hobsbawm (1976) suggested that the size and intensity of
social movements, in his case nineteenth century labour movements, relate to
long waves of economic development. Screpanti (1984) showed that strike
activity intensified during long economic upswings between 1860 and 1970
to reach peaks at the upper turning points of the long cycles; long periods of
depressions showed the lowest level of strike activity. More recent observers
see the decoupling of social protest movements from the economic system as
characteristic of the post-war period (Pakulski 1993), suggesting that the link
between economic cycles and popular unrest is historically contingent.
Secondly, nuclear power, information technology and biotechnology reach the
attention of planners, forecasters and policy makers in a time series. Table 1.1
compares basic inventions, first-time commercial innovations, and the first
related OECD policy reports for the three technologies.5 This indicator shows that
civil nuclear power gained policy focus as early as 1956; information technology
after 1971, when the OECD starting a series of reports on information technology
policies ;6 biotechnology came into the international policy focus not earlier than
1982. In terms of government policy nuclear power is older than information
technology; and information technology is older than biotechnology.
Thirdly, each of these technologies gave rise to sociological imaginings of the
'coming new era', sometimes optimistic and enthusiastic in terms of revolutions,
pessimistic in the light of doom, but often ambiguous. We find an abundance of
books and articles with titles ranging from the' atomic age',' nuclear state' (Jungk
1979), the 'micro-electronic revolution', the 'computer age', the 'information
society', the 'electronic society' (Dertouzos & Moses 1979; Lyon 1988), to the
dawning of 'biosociety', the 'age of biology' or 'bio technics' (see Bud 1993).7
Fourthly, all three technologies gained considerable media attention at different
times, although in a controversial manner mainly after the 'Oil Crisis' of 1973.
The cycle of press coverage for nuclear power, information technology and
biotechnology confirms the time series in which these three technologies have
entered the public arena. Figure 1.1 shows the shifting of media attention
between these technologies, based on several European sources.8 The peak of the
coverage is indexed with the value 100 in each case. In Germany nuclear power
reached a peak of press attention in 1979 (Kepplinger 1988, p. 665) coinciding
with large scale anti-nuclear demonstrations.9 The coverage of information
technology peaks in 1984 (Sensales 1990, p. 66), the year ominously associated
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Figure 1.1. Press coverage of nuclear power, information technology and bio-
technology in Europe 1965-90. The graph shows the development of press coverage
on three technologies. The coverage is indexed with the peak = 100. Data on nuclear
power and biotechnology from Germany; data on information technology from Italy.
with George Orwell's dystopian novel. This peak was probably reached earlier in
Germany, during the public debate on the Population Census in 1983 (Mathes &
Pfetsch 1991). The coverage of biotechnology, genome analysis and new genetics
peaks in Germany in 1989 (Kepplinger, Ehmig & Ahlheim 1991; Brodde 1992;
Ruhrmann 1992), coinciding with the publication of the parliamentary enquiry,
the Catenhusen report, into the dangers and benefits of biotechnology (see Bud,
Chapter 14, or Radkau, Chapter 16). In Britain, to date, press coverage on
biotechnology peaked in 1992, and it is likely to rise in the coming years as the
public debate intensifies (Durant, Hansen & Bauer 1996). The evidence shows
that the Asilomar conference in February 1975 (Wright, 1986), where a group
of US geneticists put a moratorium on their own research in order to explore the
social consequences first, was an event with limited impact on the European
public. Nuclear energy, information technology, and biotechnology form a series
of policy and media attention. Media attention lags behind policy attention but
the gap is decreasing (compare Table 1.1), an indication that public sensitivity to
technological issues is increasing. The ' reaction time' from first innovations to
public controversy in Europe is about 20 years for nuclear energy, 12-15 years
for information technology, and about 8-10 years for biotechnology. Public
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opinion expressed in media coverage seems to function as feedback information
for a process that is already under way.
Fifthly, all three technologies have been the subject of public controversy and
social mobilization. Nuclear power has been contested by mass movements since
the 1960s; local protests merged into anti-nuclear movements all over Europe
and gained significant influence in energy policy (see Rucht, Chapter 13). The
debate on information technology has been more of a concern for intellectuals; it
rarely mobilized large resistance beyond local actions (Kling & Iacono 1988;
Martin, Chapter 9, or Miles & Thomas, Chapter 12).10 Issues of unemployment,
social control, privacy, and security of information resulted in a cluster of opinion
surveys in the mid-1980s (Jaufmann & Kistler 1986; Bauer 1993).n Bio-
technology is the current issue: public opinion is forming on genome analysis,
gene therapy, and genetically engineered plants and animals, to date without
having mobilized mass actions. On the whole one could say that nuclear power
has a long history of debate and has mobilized large-scale resistance which moved
from local to trans-national activity. Information technology did not result in
large collective resistance; resistance is local on the level of particular industries,
work-place actions or consumer behaviour. Biotechnology is the great unknown.
Local resistance has occurred against field testing of genetically altered plants,
and public opinion has been gauged in recent years (Marlier 1992; European
Commission 1993). Jeremy Rifkin and his associates campaign worldwide against
new biotechnology and its ramifications.
In summary, nuclear energy, information technology and biotechnology have
in turn been viewed as leading technologies with long-term impacts; each of them
stimulated dreams of a' new era', from the atomic age, to the information society,
to the dawn of the biosociety. Policy concern and public debate about these
technologies came in a sequence. One can assume that the resistance against
nuclear power conditioned the resistance and its effects for later developments
(see Radkau, Chapter 16). It is likely that we are dealing with an example of
institutional learning, the building of new procedures and fora of debates at the
interfaces of science, technology and society.
Together with similarities, we need to identify differences between these
technologies. Such differences may be candidate variables for explaining the
variance in resistance that accompanied these developments.
Dissimilarities
Analogies are useful, but may also be misleading (see Radkau, Chapter 16). In
substance the three technologies contribute to different functions of human life.
Nuclear power is a source of energy; information technology deals with ways of
storing and processing information; biotechnology deals with enhanced
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production of food (fermentation, plant and animal biotechnology), and with new
forms of medical care (pharmaceutical and genetic screening and therapy). These
developments build on each other. Computers are to a large extent involved in the
development of new biotechnology for process automation, modelling and
information storage; and computers and biotechnology rely on available energy.
The three technologies differ in the choices they offer to the public. Buying a
computer is different from buying a nuclear power plant. Choices offer points of
resistance. Many different choices diffuse user resistance, and may prevent it from
becoming a social movement. Nuclear energy is mainly a question of binary
choice - yes or no - with some leeway on how large the percentage of the total
energy production of a country should be in the form of atomic energy. In
contrast, information technology and biotechnology offer wider choices. People
have some choice over the extent of computerization they want for their lives:
they may restrict the computer to assisting in a few tasks at home or at work, or
conduct all their lives with 'computer assistance', from driving a car, to cooking
a meal, to making coffee in the morning, to finding a partner. These choices are
not free from constraints, as Dorothy Nelkin (Chapter 18) will argue on the issue
of penetration of privacy. Biotechnology is similar to information technology in
terms of choice among various food products; however, when dealing with the
problem of production processes, the experimental release of genetically altered
organisms, and the issue of patenting life forms, we may be confronted with
binary choices of yes or no (see Jasanoff, Chapter 15, or Bud, Chapter 14).
Risk is both a unifying and a distinctive feature of these three technologies. The
capital limits of insuring the potential damage of a large technological project
marks a crisis point of modern societies and the transition into 'risk societies'.
According to this view it is the success of institutions, not their failure, that
undermines their basis and creates space for new political processes to emerge.
The quest for technological control leads paradoxically to increased uncertainty,
and undermines the capability for action. The distribution of unintended
consequences of technological progress becomes a conflict area that cuts across
traditional party political lines (Beck 1993).
Nuclear power is ' technically' a low risk area, with large dangers but small
probability. Incidences such as Three Mile Island or disasters such as Chernobyl
have low probabilities, but, as we all know, have happened - in 1979 and 1986,
respectively. In contrast information technology poses small dangers with high
probability. Computer addiction (Shotton 1989), exposure to VDU (visual
display unit) radiation, and posture pains such as repetitive strain injury (RSI)
are widespread, but are not regarded as alarming.12 The empirical risk of suffering
from RSI is probably larger than being contaminated by nuclear fallout. However,
risk comparison is notoriously controversial (Covello 1991). Jasanoff (Chapter
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15) will show that German, British and US expert proceedings attribute different
kinds and sizes of risks to biotechnology. Comparisons are furthermore com-
plicated by the fact that public risk perception is not cumulative; it does not add
up many small risks to give one large risk. Risk perception feeds on the size and
controllability of danger, and less on its probability. The magnitude of potential
damage differs for nuclear power, information technology, and biotechnology.
Nuclear power and biotechnology share the possibility, in the former case real, in
the latter hypothetical, of large scale, unlimited in time and space, social and
physical damage - a problem that is to a lesser extent associated with information
technology. This difference may explain the presence or absence of large-scale
organized resistance.
The type of risk makes a difference for public perception. The health risks of the
three technologies vary. Radiation touches the problem of physical well-being of
individuals and society. Leukaemia, cancer and malformations at birth are issues
central to people's life concerns. By contrast the problems of information
technology are more abstract: it seems to alter the way we think and make
decisions;' artificial intelligence' seems to bother mainly people with expertise in
the field of 'thinking', such as intellectuals and academics. Information
technology has not lent itself to mass mobilization of resistance that goes beyond
local issues except in Germany in 1983 and 1987 where a computer readable
identity card and the population census became a major issue (Mathes & Pfetsch
1991). Radiation fallout from accidents like Chernobyl poses risks without limits;
the event had consequences in Northern Scandinavia within days. Power stations
may pose geographically concentrated risks of leukaemia and cancer in the
vicinity. The problematic impacts of information technology are more widely
scattered and mostly transitory; and impacts such as enhanced social control and
penetration of privacy are more symbolic and difficult to recognize (see Nelkin,
Chapter 18). In new areas of biotechnology and genetic engineering health risks
are an open question, and more of a diffuse but widespread concern than well
defined.
The three technologies differ in capital intensity and geographical concen-
tration. Nuclear power is the most expensive technology per investment unit. It
may have once been part of the expert imagination that each household would
have a nuclear power generator in the back garden, in the basement or in the
automobile ;13 but nuclear energy production became concentrated in large plant
sites-423 sites in 24 countries by 1990. Information technology is radically
different. Computing units have become increasingly smaller and cheaper and
are widely distributed in business and in households as mainframes, micros, PCs
(personal computers), laptops or notebooks, or as integrated parts of an increasing
number of artefacts. Similarly, biotechnology does not require the large-scale
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.197.39 on Wed Jan 04 15:41:15 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511563706.002
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
10 Martin Bauer
investments of nuclear energy with all that it implies for the disposal or re-
processing of nuclear waste. The human genome project is a small investment
compared to the nuclear programmes over the last 40 years. The biotechnology
industry started up in small businesses linked to university departments (Wright
1986), and turned into a venture of established chemical industries in recent
years. Within one country nuclear power is centralized technology, while
information technology and biotechnology tend to be distributed technologies.
Whether the enterprise is private or public makes a difference. Nuclear power
and computers were initially a state enterprise from research and development to
production, a matter of national security linked to the capacity to produce ' the
Bomb' and to make large-scale calculations in missile technology. Private
companies take over later: nuclear power remains a state enterprise in many
countries until the present time while the diffusion of information technology and
biotechnology is predominantly a matter of private business. Public control is
limited to setting legal boundaries and incentives for investment. The involvement
of the state makes nuclear power a direct political issue. Nuclear power is public
technology; information technology and biotechnology are primarily private
technologies. This leads to a different culture of industry. The nuclear power
industry inherited a tradition of secrecy from its military roots. Research and
development was conducted behind closed doors, dictated by national security
during the Cold War years. The chemical, computer and communications
industries are more open. Their processes and products are more visible in
everyday use. Public enterprise does not mean an open culture, and private
developments do not imply a culture of secrecy.
The public discourse of technology varies across and within technology over
time. The geographical concentration of nuclear power makes it visible in the
landscape as an icon of 'progress', 'doom', or 'a devil's bargain' (Gamson
& Modigliani 1989). The Cold War favoured images of secrecy and national
security in relation to nuclear power, while the 1980s favoured the imperative
of international economic competition. Neither information technology nor
biotechnology is a major issue of national security, but does impact on national
competitiveness. Confronted with the threat of terrorism nuclear power implied
intensified social control, perhaps even a police state within the 'nuclear state'
(Jungk 1979): it has similarities with information technology in terms of political
risk. Another variable of discourse is the 'newness' of technology. Jasanoff
(Chapter 15) shows that for biotechnology the context dictates the rhetoric: for
purposes of fund raising and innovation policy 'novelty' and 'revolution' are
appealing arguments. However, to prevent legislation and judicial activity,
'novelty' is an undesirable argument as existing regulations are supposed to
suffice; new biotechnologies 'become' forms of brewing and breeding, or 'old
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wine in new bottles'. The effects of 'newness' on the mobilization of resistance
may be seen by comparison with 'old' technologies, e.g. the automobile or
hydroelectric energy. According to all of these criteria - choices offered, risks
involved, capital intensity, public or private, the culture of industry, and
public image - nuclear power stands apart from information technology and
biotechnology.
Larger contexts may account for similarities
Beyond these differences and the similarities of high expectations, innovation
policy focus, media coverage and public controversies, all three technologies
share the historical context of the post-war period. Four features of that period
may explain the similarities: the end of Utopian visions, the Cold War period, the
changing role of expertise, and the shift in cultural values.
The last waves of Utopianism motivated the 1968 student protests and have
calmed down since; Utopias seem no longer suitable for conceiving the future.
The criteria for criticizing our civilization towards the end of the twentieth
century are diffuse. The malaise concerns the question: where are we going ? The
notion of 'Progress', writ large, is in crisis again (see Touraine, Chapter 2). The
equation of progress and new technology is no longer taken for granted. Bold
expectations of the future give way to concern for the present; optimism
transforms into caution; democratic expectations become immediate and more
widespread. In the search for sustainable development from a global perspective
we need to co-opt dissent, rather than ignoring it, blinded by a vision for the
future. We are interested in those who resisted without a vision of the future and
trace the precursors of modern technology assessments: the actions of the latter-
day guilds and Luddites to new technology. We are busy reinventing institutions
that traditionally bridged the gap between the place of action and the place of
consequences; institutions that got lost in the way of 'Progress' (Schot 1991).
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Cold War came to an end. The
mobilization of science and technology to ensure a balance of military forces
framed the public debates in all Western countries. Decontextualizing the three
technologies from this common context may lead to false conclusions. The Cold
War affected public discourse at all levels. National security was a whitewash
for much mismanagement, many disasters and cover ups. Whole research
programmes were conducted secretly. The discourse of new technology was
framed by the East-West divide. Secrecy throws expertise into disrepute
(Knorre 1992). The present situation may bring a different pattern of public
response to new technology. The lack of democratic decision making on grounds
of security is no longer justified; the end of the Cold War strengthens the
aspirations of various groups of people to have a say.
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We have witnessed over the last 30 years the disenchantment with expertise.
Technocracy is not a socially acceptable form of government. The idea of
technocracy is a modern idea, and equally the struggle against technocracy is
part of modernity; resistance is part of this parallel process to secure freedom of
choice. Anti-big business and anti-technocracy unites all three movements of
resistance (see Touraine, Chapter 2). Bureaucracy is the target, rather than
engineering or science itself. We find some similarity of motives with the Luddites
(Randall, Chapter 3), who opposed a particular way of putting machines to work
to avert the dissolution of their life world. Current technological resistance
equally fights the process, not the product, of technological development. The
issues are often public deceit and lies; manipulation and exclusion; pollution and
exploitation; expert conspiracy; and the unequal distribution of risks.
The argument of a changing culture ties in with Inglehart's (1990, p. 143)
diagnosis of a value shift in advanced industrial society from a material to a post-
material orientation. Post-materialists believe in ideas and celebrate personal
relationships, and want a say in their jobs, freedom of speech, and democracy. In
contrast the materialists favour above all law and order, economic growth, and
low inflation. The end of the Cold War, the loss of Utopia, the disenchantment
with expertise and the culture shift point to a common context for nuclear power,
information technology and biotechnology in the development of science, tech-
nology and industry. This opens up the possibility of analysing the functions of
resistance for these three post-1945 developments: similar functions achieved
with changing structures.
What are the forms of resistance?
The problem of definition
The first problem is to define resistance. In the following pages I take stock of ways
that 'resistance' has been defined in various contexts. Mokyr (1990) lists resist-
ance among the major variables that explain variance in technological develop-
ment such as life expectancy, nutrition, willingness to bear risks, geography,
path dependency, labour costs, science, religion, values, institutions and property
rights, politics and the state, war, openness to new information, and demography.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 'resist' means 'to withstand, to
prevent, to repel, to stand against, to stop' in four different contexts: to describe
human actions, to describe the power or capacity of such actions, to describe the
opposing relation of forces, and to describe specifically the non-conductivity of
electricity, magnetism or heat. 'Resistance' as human action means the 'refusal
to comply with some demand'; and historically the clandestine insurgence
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against an occupying, illegitimate power during the Second World War of which
the French 'Resistance', the German ' Widerstand' or the Italian 'Resistenza' are
well-known examples. I see three distinctions constitutive of what counts as
resistance in the present context: rationality/irrationality, resistance/opposition,
and the problem of self-reference.
Resistance as diversion from the 'one best way'
In the context of (social) engineering, resistance is traditionally the deviation from
the Rational writ large, or F. W. Taylor's 'one best way'. Planners, engineers,
managers and designers encounter the world as a set of ill-defined problems (see
Staudenmaier, Chapter 7). To structure this uncertainty increases predictability
and control over matter and people. Resistance is the uncertainty of the designer
struggling with matter and people that needs to be reduced. Rationality is
claimed by the designer, and actions that challenge his or her proposal are
'resistance'. However, a design is necessarily 'bounded' within constraints of
space and time (Simon 1981) and the notion of a single best solution-
Rationality writ large-is hardly justifiable. Under any constraint different
assumptions suggest different solutions and legitimate the 'resistance' to a single
best design.
Any design reduces some kind of uncertainty while creating others both for the
designer and for the users. Risk analysis quantifies this as the product of damage
and its probability. To take expert calculations and deviations from this baseline
as 'bias' in risk perception is a common way of defining resistance (see Bauer
critically on 'technophobia', Chapter 5). Bias is the outcome of either missing
information or 'inadequate' information processing. 'Debiasing' popular percep-
tions with additional information and special training makes good business,
but seems naive as it assumes that additional information leads to the same
conclusions for everyone. People are affected differently by the same information.
Different assumptions suggest different conclusions on the same information.
Staudenmaier (Chapter 7) points out that historical narratives of great
technological projects may pay legitimate tribute to' great human achievements';
but they are 'Whiggish' in outlook and selective with facts. Complementary
stories need to be told to understand the dynamics of technological developments:
the stories of losers, sidetrackings, failures and obstacles on the way. Even the
story of' great men' is incomplete. Human achievements are ambiguous. Human
actions encounter durability, material and cultural, which a universal notion of
Rationality cannot displace without violence. Alain Touraine (Chapter 2)
discusses this as the crisis of Progress leaving us in a conflict between the Scylla
and Charybdis of narcissistic particularism and the universalism of large projects,
both equally undesirable in the light of historical experience. Resistance re-
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emerges as the dignity of bearing the tensions in between two illusory seductions
in the late twentieth century without giving in to either of them (Touraine 1992).
Resistance and opposition
Both activities, resistance and opposition, challenge a given project, although in
different relations to social institutions. Opposition is challenging activity within
institutional boundaries. 'Institutional' activities are those that can be expected
to happen. Resistance is best understood as activity which is unexpected in both
content and form by the innovators. This does not preclude an observer predicting
such activities; the surprise of the innovator and designer is crucial. This
distinction allows us to describe the transition from resistance to opposition,
whereby activities are institutionalized and become predictable; when institutions
are dismantled, opposition activities can become resistance.
Furthermore, resistance is a form of risky behaviour. Someone who violates
norms and rules runs the risk of exclusion, punishment or material sanctions. The
legal discussion of the' right to resistance' tackles the paradox of justifying actions
outside the law without undermining the rule of law. This is done with a view to
law as a process {Rechtsfortbildung); the legal system is always imperfect and in
need of improvement along the lines of the constitution (Rhinow 1985). If
resistance breaks a norm and institutions play a role in defining that norm,
resistance as action is the product of normative communication. The more
restrictive the norms, the larger the range of activities that count as resistance.
Resistance is defined by a system that is in and of this conflict.14
Self-reference and resistance
Several questions point to the problem of self-reference. Does resistance always
have clear motives and purpose, or can activities challenge a technological project
without such motives and purpose? Do the resistant persons see themselves as
being resistant or not; or, in other words, is 'resistance' an observer category or
a category of self-description, or both? What activity counts as an act of
resistance ? We are dealing with the logical hierarchy of actions and behaviour:
various behaviours can qualify as resistance actions depending on the context of
motivation.
A clear motive and a conscious purpose to challenge a project in unexpected
ways define an act of resistance.' Purposeful' resistance means that the action is
willed and planned, and that some consequences, positive or negative, likely or
unlikely, are taken into account. It is risky action. Resistance may follow a moral
imperative in justifying the motive. An ethical and moral discourse may provide
the grounds for resisting a certain project.
Purpose and motive make the difference between resistance and mere
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avoidance behaviour, such as not buying something, or not consuming or using
it once a device has been bought. If avoidance meant resistance, this would imply
that there is an obligation to consume in the first place. Some people would
strongly argue the need to distinguish between deliberate boycott and the
reluctance to consume or to change from typewriter to word processing out of
ignorance or lack of opportunity. 'Not buying' becomes resistance only in
purposeful consumer boycott. Conscious purpose and motive transform mere
behaviour into dignified resistance. Defining resistance as the continuum from
'not consuming' to 'risking one's life' seems inadequate. Risking one's life for a
moral reason has a dignity that does not seem comparable to mere non-
consumption for non-specific reasons.
However, the problem of consciousness complicates the issue. To define
resistance by its purpose may do justice to the moral claim, but it may be that a
variety of events, often silent, unspectacular, everyday actions are equally
functional in challenging a technological project, or setting limits to its power. It
may be a way of life not to go along with a project, not out of high moral purpose,
but out of tradition or parochial concerns (Scott 1985). Wynne (1993) shows
how forms of so-called ' public ignorance' of science and technology are unor-
ganized ways of negotiating an acceptable relationship with experts by limiting
their cognitive control. Avoidance behaviour is an observer category; people buy
goods or not, use them or not, are indifferent and frustrate one's expectations.
Our actions involve variable degrees of awareness. We may be fully conscious,
partially conscious, temporarily unconscious, or entirely unaware of what we are
achieving with our actions. The attitude often follows the action, and we come to
intend what we are already doing. In raising consciousness about what we are
doing, we may adjust our attitudes to our behaviours. Behaviours without a
conscious motive cannot be ruled out as forms of resistance by their consequences.
In that sense the high moral purpose seems not to be a sufficient criterion for
resistance actions.
Actions may differ in their ethical and moral dignity, but functionally they may
well have similar effects.15 For the present purpose we shall explore effects of
resistance with or without motives; intentions serve to classify effects as
anticipated or not. The discourse on the morality of resistance is a variable that
is itself an indicator of the intensity of resistance. The more people reflect on the
dignity of resistance the more pressing is the problem of resistance. Miles and
Thomas (Chapter 12) see resistance as a narrow range of actions on one end of
the continuum of acceptance of information technology. We should perhaps talk
about resistance in the functional sense with a small V and in the moral sense
with a capital 'R'.
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Towards a taxonomy
A taxonomy of resistance tries to distinguish different qualities and intensities of
resistance. Kinds and strength of resistance are important for assessing differential
effects on new technologies in various contexts. Identifying forms of resistance
is also a precondition for the analysis of the internal dynamics of resistance, as it
transforms with contexts and time.
Active/passive and individual/collective
Resistance is frequently described as active or passive. Active refers to purposeful
actions that may involve violence against persons or objects: direct attacks
against machines, the destruction of machines, the intrusion or occupation of
building sites. This may include forms of violence that are often confined to a
small circle of determined, specially trained and motivated activists. By contrast,
passive resistance comprises forms of wilful inactivity, where bodily movements
are restricted: non-compliance, blocking, sit-ins, not doing things one is expected
to do by law. Passive resistance is more easily turned into mass action, as people
do not need special training and it may be physically less demanding.
Another distinction draws a line between resistance as an action of one or
many individuals: individual, cumulative or collective resistance. Isolated
individuals may resist a project; large numbers of people can resist with
cumulative effect without coordinating their actions.16 An observer can identify
the effects of these actions. People themselves may not see it. The cumulative effect
of uncoordinated actions can be functionally equivalent to organized actions in a
repressive context. Formal structures are both enabling and constraining, and
some observers take them as a necessary criterion for resistance (see Nelkin,
Chapter 18). The degree of coordination of resistance is a variable. Individuals
may coalesce into movements, new movements may co-opt existing structures.
Mazur (1975) has shown how the US anti-nuclear movement rode on the back
of the older environmental movement. Jeremy Rifkin explicitly tries to co-opt
animal rights groups, vegetarians, environmentalists, and Third World awareness
groups into a 'rainbow' coalition for his apocalyptic struggle against
biotechnology incorporated.
International activities must be distinguished by the mode of aggregation:
multinational resistance operates from a hierarchical centre that coordinates and
plans analogously to a multinational business (e.g. Greenpeace; Jeremy Rifkin);
in contrast there is trans-national resistance which works as a forum for
discussion more like the United Nations: hierarchical with various autonomous
centres of activity (e.g. the international anti-nuclear movement).
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Classes of actions and levels of analysis
In a stocktaking exercise a variety of behaviour patterns can be identified as
'resistance', of which civil disobedience is the most salient one. Sharp (1973)
distinguishes symbolic actions, such as collecting signatures, distributing flyers
and pamphlets and rallying, from non-cooperation and non-violent interventions.
Among the latter are site occupations; setting up anti-nuclear camps; mass
demonstrations or sit-ins that intervene with the normal course of the daily
activities. Many of these forms are ritualistic, and so inhibit violence in similar
ways to the rituals of the Luddites (see Randall, Chapter 3).
Economic behaviours include consumer boycotts, avoiding the consumption of
certain products, or refusing to give services to certain institutions. We find
campaigning by consumer organizations on behalf of users and consumers.
Technological innovations may precipitate industrial action.
Cultural and symbolic activities are the public display of the ambiguity towards
new technology (see Staudenmaier, Chapter 7). Cultural activities include film
making, writing popular books, giving talks, ordering arguments and organizing
conferences on controversial issues. Ambiguity is displayed in variations on the
image of the 'mad or irresponsible scientists' or of 'Dr Frankenstein and his
monster' as the motive force in science fiction writing and film. Resistance relies on
alternative value patterns, an ethos of dissent, or religious values. Sociological
evidence suggests that absolute religious values have become more salient in
recent years and with them has come an uneasiness with compromise (see
Nelkin, Chapter 18). The media's coverage of science and technology is an
indicator of cultural resistance which Kepplinger (Chapter 17) analyses and
critically addresses. Anxieties and fears ('technophobia', 'nuclearphobia', and
' cyberphobia') may result in a retreat from public life into the confines of privacy
and into a controllable small world of non-engagement and alternative lifestyles.
Legal actions involve a call upon the state to regulate, in some countries by
calling for a plebiscite. Thus, political lobbying and voting behaviour may indicate
technological resistance (Buchmann, Chapter 10). In the USA activists force
judicial rulings to change the law in litigations against individuals, corporations,
or institutions. Court cases of this kind are called in the name of civil rights that
are violated in the context of new technology.
We may distinguish levels of analysis. Our daily activity resists physical
influences; we resist the weather, the sun, the heat and the cold in various ways;
our immune system resists noxious agents. At the level of cognition we resist the
'external' influence on our experience that is mediated by film, radio or print
media. At the organizational level the work-place is an arena of resistance against
new technology, abject working conditions and exploitations. At the culti :al
level we may resist changes that are suggested or even imposed by exponents of
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other cultures on our way of life; where cultures meet there will be resistance.
Symbolic meaning is both a resource and an object of resistance as shown by
Staudenmaier (Chapter 7) in the case of popular images of Henry Ford in
the USA.
Measuring the intensity of resistance
Measuring the intensity of resistance is essential to compare its effects across time,
technology and national contexts. Measures of resistance allow us to associate
resistance and effects in a systematic manner. Several measures of resistance will
be put forward in this book.
I myself shall critically discuss how resistance to new technology has been
measured psychometrically, and has been defined as a clinical problem. A test
score defines 'cyberphobia', a supposedly 'irrational' form of anxiety towards
information technology, that is claimed to be widespread. The measurement
consists of two steps: first, to define ' cyberphobia' on a test distribution; secondly,
to screen a population using this test as a criterion.
Daamen and van der Lans (Chapter 4) show how resistance to nuclear power,
information technology and biotechnology is measured by negative attitudes on
a multi-item scale of survey responses. The validity of survey measures is critically
discussed in the light of the assimilation effect. Attitude measures are sensitive to
the immediate context of data collection. Context effects throw light on artefacts
occurring in survey measurements.
Rucht (Chapter 13) counts and analyses press coverage of protest events across
countries. The type of event, the number of participants, and the degree of
violence provide an indicator of resistance to nuclear power in different countries
over an extended period of time.
Botelho (Chapter 11) demonstrates how diffusion studies measure resistance
in a market system by the differentials in the diffusion rates of new products or
processes. The later and the slower the process, the larger is the resistance of the
system. Geographical concentration of an idea, process or product is another
indicator for resistance in diffusion systems (Hagerstrand 1967). Some regions
adopt new ideas and products, others not, so that over time clusters of diffusion
appear in the landscape. Such processes are modelled by degrees of resistance in
regions.
Miles and Thomas (Chapter 12) arrange forms of resistance to information
technologies on an ordinal classification from non-acceptance at one extreme to
resistance at the other. Degrees of non-acceptance of consumer electronics are:
reluctant purchase; infrequent use, once purchased; partial use of functions;
bewilderment over choice; and the moratorium 'no'. The criterion of acceptance
is the purchase of consumer goods.
Comparing the intensity of resistance across the three technologies leads to the
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following conclusion: resistance is strongest against nuclear power, weakest in
the case of information technology, and, to date, medium for biotechnology.17
Information technology imposes small damage with high probability: no large-
scale resistance has formed, yet. Nuclear power is characterized by high damage
potential with relatively low probability. The risks of biotechnology are still
largely unknown. The resistance against information technology is mostly local
and a matter of' intellectuals'; it is mainly informal, individual, and passive, such
as refusal to work with computers. Organized resistance, as in the British printing
industry (see Martin, Chapter 9), seems to be infrequent.
What is being resisted and why?
The title of this book suggests that the object of resistance is technology. This
common-sense assumption is, as we shall see, problematic. What is being resisted
is normally complex and requires empirical analysis. The study of resistance
needs to face the possibility that resistance is more easily characterized by the
process and its effects than by its antecedents; the causes may be more numerous
than the effects.
Resistance may be directed against the machinery and the technical devices
involved, as they become the symbolic focus of what infringes people's livelihood;
this is traditionally the meaning of the term' Luddism' or' machine breaking' (see
critically Randall, Chapter 3). It may be useful to distinguish resisting hardware
from resisting its consequences. The latter case may target a parameter of the
design, rather than the design as a whole. Effects have different ranges: personal,
local, national, international. Local consequences differ from consequences in
distant places by their significance.
Often it is neither design nor consequences that are resisted, but the process by
which the technology is put to work that is found wanting. Manipulation, being
patronizing and breaking informal contracts are the problems.18 However, it
makes only limited sense to separate the design idea from its implementation. The
implementation is the design in time and specific contexts.
Big business and state power appear to be the principle object of resistance
(Touraine, Chapter 2, or Evers & Nowotny 1987). New technologies are financed,
developed and implemented by large corporate sectors or state bureaucracies
under expert guidance, often in the context of defence and warfare.' Technocracy'
seeks to abolish politics and, by implication, to exclude the citizen and the public
from the decision-making process; technocrats regard politics as an interference
in the rational techno-logic. In such a context, neither science nor technology
themselves are resisted, but their exclusive control by experts who are not held
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.197.39 on Wed Jan 04 15:41:15 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511563706.002
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
20 Martin Bauer
accountable in order to enhance control over non-experts. Intertwined as it
became historically with a technocratic world project, not least in its Soviet
version, 'scientific universalism' lost more and more of its appeal.
Another distinction is that between product innovation and process inno-
vation. Process innovations increase the efficiency of production with new
procedures and capital goods. Product innovations are new consumer goods.
People resist new processes at the work-place and as investors and producers (see
Bruland, Chapter 6); they resist new products as consumer (see Miles & Thomas,
Chapter 12). Process innovations will be a focus for labour organizations, and
product innovations for consumer organizations.
It is the new technology that is resisted, rather than the old one. 'Newness'
makes a difference, not least because risks are difficult to assess, and the resulting
uncertainty stifles action. 'Newness' is relative to place and time. Whether a
technology is new is a matter of debate. Newness is claimed and highly desirable
in the context of patenting, but it is not necessarily desirable in public debates on
regulations. The features of public resistance are themselves the outcome of public
debates, not least in the form of social scientific inputs into that debate.
Historically resistance is found in the context of technology transfer of fishing
nets and techniques, the steam saw and automobiles in Scandinavia (Bruland,
Chapter 6); and against the introduction of textile machinery in the early
nineteenth century in Britain (Randall, Chapter 3). Its targets are specific
implementations, a particular mix of techniques, or a technology at large.
Furthermore, technology is resisted because it signifies the hegemony of a foreign
power (Touraine, Chapter 2).
With regard to nuclear technology, various events are the object of resistance:
nuclear power plants per se, government nuclear policy, the siting of particular
plants, the disposal of nuclear waste in the sea or under ground, its transport over
long distances, increased levels of radiation in the vicinity of installations, and
nuclear power as foreign domination (see Rucht, Chapter 13, or MacLeod,
Chapter 8).
With information technology, consequences are the object of resistance: the
intrusion of privacy with sophisticated marketing control methods (Nelkin,
Chapter 18); the threat posed to freedom and democracy by centralized social
control over and misuse of information. VDU radiation and repetitive strains pose
some health risks. Obfuscation of decision making with artificial intelligence
is a major concern for people with intellectual commitments (e.g. Weizenbaum
1976). Loss in quality of working life, de-skilling, changing job structures, bad
quality of user interfaces, and job redundancies are resisted. Electronic pub-
lishing revolutionized the printing process, making various intermediary tasks
redundant. The conflict at Fleet Street, London, tells this story (see Martin,
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Chapter 9). Products such as minitel, audiotext and videotext diffuse at different
rates in different countries (Miles & Thomas, Chapter 12). Current concerns
about new media focus upon the spreading of pornographic material and of
computer addiction, a protective concern on behalf of youth, with a legal angle
when 'hackers' intrude and interfere with sensitive data bases.
Resistance to biotechnology targets the siting of research facilities, as, for
example, in Switzerland (see Buchmann, Chapter 10), the field testing of
genetically altered plants, the breeding of transgenic animals, the patenting of life
forms, and experimentation with human embryos and new reproductive tech-
nologies for humans. The control of the genetic code is open to abuse. For
Jeremy Rifkin this constitutes the latest in a series of secular 'enclosures' for
purposes of exploitation: from land, to sea, to air, and now to genes. Processes,
products, and their implications are resisted, where the sanctity of life and nature,
biodiversity, and the sustainable development of the world are at stake.
The concept of resistance motivation summarizes those processes which start
and end the resistance activity, and which maintain the momentum of activity in
the face of obstacles, and maintain vigilance in the absence of a real concern
(Haltiner 1986). It covers all processes of individual and collective mobilization.
Motives describe particular processes of that kind. Owing to its ambiguous nature
the technological process is accompanied by anticipations of known and
unknown dangers and risks. Fear and anxiety are primarily evolutionary
achievements that prepare the organism for adequate action in situations of
danger. Emotions such as fears and anxieties redirect energies and prepare for
necessary actions. Resistance often reveals competing 'Weltanschauungen'.
Images and visions of the future are motives both for technological design and for
resistance to technology (see Staudenmaier, Chapter 7). Anticipations of doom
may motivate actions to avert the catastrophe scenario. The diagnosed shift in
cultural values (Inglehart 1990) influences people's preferences in private
consumption and political behaviour. Finally there is motivation resulting from
the recursive effects of resistance on itself; initial success mobilizes individual and
collective energies for future action and rallies support and new resources; failure
may lead to both increased determination or to loss of confidence; resources are
depleted and resistance may come to an end.
Who is resisting?
Any study of resistance needs to identify the actors. Who are the people that
resist a particular technology or new technology in general; how do they
differ from other social groups; how large is this group, and where are they
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located within the structures of society ? Generally there are two ways of defining
social groups, statistically in terms of socio-demographic variables ('statistical
groups'), or according to self-reported membership ('natural groups').
Natural groups
Natural groups provide a social identity and are often formally organized with a
legal status as a club or society that carries a name. Specific groups that have been
associated with resistance to new technologies are groups with a cultural mission.
C. P. Snow's distinction of a world of arts and a world of science (Snow 1959;
Hultberg 1991) has recently been called upon. Arts and the social sciences are
associated with ignorance of and resistance to science and technology. Kepplinger
(Chapter 17) recognizes in particular the post-1968 generation as political editors
and agenda setters within the German press, the 'reflective elite' that through
its position influences public opinion about technology negatively.
New radical social movements such as feminists, environmentalists and animal
rights movements are associated with resistance to new technology. Religious
groups rally for moral concerns and stricter regulation of biotechnology. Activists
such as Jeremy Rifkin in the USA rally rainbow coalitions around campaigns,
which recently included chefs signing up to refuse to use genetically altered
vegetables in their cooking. Much organized resistance is community and culture
based, rather than based on economic categories such as labour or consumers.
Local networks of people galvanize into large-scale activity under favourable
conditions such as economic growth, persistent leadership and coalitions.
The anti-nuclear movement is made up of numerous groups with an
international network and constitutes a well-defined topic of social research
(Riidig 1990). The resistance to computer technology is less organized. At times,
but not generally, trade unions are the organizational resources for resisting
changes in production technology (see Martin, Chapter 9). Kling & Iacono (1988)
identify three core actors of the 'counter-computer movement': libertarians
concerned with civil rights and privacy issues; consumerists concerned with new
forms of consumer credit; trade unionists concerned with impacts on the number
and quality of jobs; and pacifists concerned with computerized warfare and the
likelihood of wars. All these groups are formed around wider issues, and take up
the resistance to certain developments in computing and information technology
as part of their activity.
'Green' parties are trans-national and core activists like Greenpeace or Jeremy
Rifkin are international actors of resistance to nuclear power and biotechnology,
less so to information technology. Touraine (Chapter 2) points to the resistance of
governments, for example in Islamic countries, who for reasons of nationalist
politics may resist new technologies to block foreign hegemony. Botelho (Chapter
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11) shows how a civil service elite with a particular vision of research is a factor
of resistance, in this case unintended, in the development of semi-conductor
technology in post-war France.
Statistical groups
Various classes of actors can be distinguished on purely conceptual criteria. Such
criteria are not normally used by people to define their social identities.
Sociological analysis suggests that the social basis of new social movements, some
of which take among other preoccupations an anti-technological position, is
diverse, but to a large extent middle class (Pakulski 1993). However, the
correlation between an economic position and social mobilization weakens in the
post-war period. According to Touraine (Chapter 2) cultural conflicts will
increasingly supersede socio-economic ones. Value orientations increasingly
explain political mobilization better than income or property based social
stratifications (Buchmann, Chapter 10). Beck (1993) predicts a realignment of
the political sphere over the distribution of large technological risks which is
superimposed on the traditional conflicts over income distribution.
General public opinion is continuously gauged in social surveys and opinion
polls. It caused a shock wave in 1984 when a German AUensbach poll found that
10% of the German population regarded technology as evil, and 54% partly so.
The percentage of those who regarded technology as ' a good thing' dropped from
72% in 1966 to 32% eighteen years later (Jaufmann & Kistler 1986). Opinion
polls and attitude research located negative attitudes towards information
technology and computing in the mid-1980s among the less skilled, low earning,
female, rural, older and left-orientated parts of the population (Bauer 1993).
Studies on ' cyberphobia' (see Bauer, Chapter 5) report its prevalence among
women, the less educated and the marginalized.
Vested interests in past investment is a frequently mentioned category of actors;
Bruland (Chapter 6) shows how in Scandinavia holders of old capital obstructed
the building of new capital in the form of new machines and new methods of
production. Historically labour elites such as cotton spinners or wool combers,
or groups such as small farmers, labourers, brick makers and paper makers,
were resisting new technology during the industrial revolution (see Randall,
Chapter 3).
Buchmann (Chapter 10) shows how in Switzerland the combination of
traditional values, social marginality and habitual nay-saying forms a cluster of
motives that explains negative votes in a national referendum on the regulation
of biotechnology and reproductive medicine.
A rising number of people choose 'soft medical treatment', and practise
astrology and parasciences which coexist with beliefs in, activities in and support
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for science proper. Observers often tend to construe such practices as expressions
of anti-scientific attitudes; however, these practices serve different needs and are
therefore not necessarily contradictory (Touraine, Chapter 2).
In organizational research it was a traditional claim that resistance is a matter
of corporate hierarchy: the lower in the hierarchy the more likely is the resistance
to innovations (Lawrence 1954; Johns 1973). The arrival of information
technology and computers since the 1960s has altered this empirical finding. For
some time resistance to the use of computers polarized on the top and on the
bottom of the corporate hierarchy, with middle management being the
innovators. In the context of new manufacturing methods (e.g. CIM, production
islands), the middle strata are likely to resist the innovations (Klein 1984; Littek
& Heisig 1986; Carloppio 1988). The position of the middle management is
often at risk in the flattened hierarchical structures that computers may bring.
In the corporate context resistance is no longer related to hierarchy; depending
on the context, resistance is found at all levels of the corporate hierarchy.
Non-users, purchasers of electronic equipment who make only partial use of it,
and family members who do not use the electronic devices that other members
have bought (Miles & Thomas, Chapter 12) are categories of consumers that
resist technology by underuse. Non-using may be deliberate resistance, or it may
be an indicator of uselessness, functionally equivalent to pushing a product out of
the market. Similarly the biotechnology industry anxiously anticipates consumers
who will hesitate to buy genetically altered foodstuffs, such as the 'flavr savr'
tomatoes specially engineered for a longer shelf life. The controversy on what
information product labels should contain speaks clearly of the nervousness in the
biotechnology industry.
What are the effects of resistance?
The literature on resistance is rich in descriptions of the various forms of
resistance, the analysis of its actors, and of the causes, motives and conditions.
Most studies focus on resistance as the dependent variable. The analysis of
resistance by consequences, with resistance as an explanatory and independent
variable of technological change, is rare; corresponding chapters in textbooks
tend to be thin. Findings on consequences of resistance are best developed for the
anti-nuclear protest movements (Riidig 1990; see Rucht, Chapter 13).
Principally four dimensions of effects may be distinguished:
* foreseen and unforeseen effects,
* direct and indirect effects,
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* impact and recursive effects,
* functional and dysfunctional effects.
These analytical dimensions define in combination a theoretical space of sixteen
types of effects: from foreseen-direct-functional impact to unforeseen-indirect-
recursive and dysfunctional effects.
Direct effects are the immediate effects on the innovation process, while indirect
effects impinge on the technological process via mediating processes. Indirect
effects are often instrumental in reaching the objectives of actors. The distinction
of foreseen and unforeseen refers to the point of view of resistance actors.
Unforeseen effects cannot be intended, while foreseen effects may be intended but
need not. It may be helpful to distinguish the effects of resistance on the
technological processes, and recursive effects on the resistance itself in terms of
structural changes: growth, motivation, disintegration and decline. Functional
or dysfunctional refers to the long-term effects of resistance on the technological
process. Functional effects increase the viability of a project, dysfunctional effects
decrease it, depending on the level of analysis; effects that are dysfunctional on
one level may be functional on another level and vice versa. Events are not a priori
functional or dysfunctional; it depends on the process dynamics. Processes
assumed to be functional may turn dysfunctional under conditions that have to
be clarified empirically; events may be both functional and dysfunctional simul-
taneously but for different processes. Commonly, functional and dysfunctional
correspond with the positive or negative value. Actors try to reduce dysfunctional
effects and to increase functional ones. However, from an observer's point of view
we are able to appreciate the positive consequences of seemingly dysfunctional events.
Finally, resistance does not determine its own consequences; its effects are
contingent. Similar forms and intensities of resistance result in different nuclear
power programmes in different countries. Traditions of legal regulation channel
the voicing of resistance and constrain its effects on technological developments
(see Rucht, Chapter 13, Jasanoff, Chapter 15, or Martin, Chapter 9). In analysing
effects we need to take into account the reactions of innovators and regulatory
bodies. These contingencies make it difficult to attribute 'causality' between
resistance and its effects. More realistic are circular influences where past effects
condition the future relationship between resistance and its effects. This
relationship is itself a variable.
Direct and foreseen effects
Direct effects are often reactions of actors such as governments, international
agencies or corporate management challenged by resistance whose actions alter
the trajectory of technology. On the one hand, actors may try to calm a conflict
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situation with the revision of a project or a policy reform: a response that may be
in timing and content the effect of resistance activities. On the other hand, forms
of repression and police actions need to be expected as resistance often transgresses
the boundaries of legality. The state is called to enforce the rule of the law.
Repression may be successful in temporarily suppressing resistance activity;
however, in many cases this is only to strengthen its resilience, and to widen its
mobilization basis, and media coverage, and to lead to silent conversion among
the wider public (Raschke 1988, p. 355; Mugny & Perez 1991, p. 154).
Preventing an event from happening is the strongest direct effect. A project may
be abandoned in response to resistance as in the case of the Austrian nuclear
power plant 'Zwentendorf near Vienna, mothballed before it started to produce
energy. Other effects are: delaying the resisted events; postponing a final decision;
abandoning a project for good, or for only a limited period of time. The Luddite
struggle against machinery is an example of the latter. The introduction of textile
machinery was postponed in a particular area of Northern England (Randall,
Chapter 3).
Resistance lowers the level of expectations of innovators. The exuberant ex-
pectations of many a project face a 'reality test' on resistance, and get adjusted.
A striking example is shown by the international projections for nuclear energy.
The exuberant predictions of the 1950s and 1960s were massively reduced in the
1970s. Figure 1.2 shows the projections for 1977, 1980 and 1990 together
with the actual development of world nuclear energy production. The actual
production in 1990 is about half the projection of 1977. The projection for
the year 2000 in 1990 is less than a quarter of that of 1977 (IAEA 1981;
WNIH 1992).
A further effect of resistance is the relocation of innovations (Rucht, Chapter 13).
Resistance to new technology may have spatial and cluster effects. Successful
resistance in one location is no guarantee of success in other locations. This
results in concentration of the technology in one region or in one country, while
in neighbouring areas the technology is hardly present (Hagerstrand 1967). The
effect will be the spatial distribution of new technology. Nuclear power is an
example: some countries, such as France or Japan, have realized a large nuclear
power programme while other countries have abandoned it. In the debate on new
biotechnology dislocation is a much anticipated effect. If companies are prevented
from building research facilities in some areas by local resistance or because of
strict safety regulations, they may move into other countries, and finally to the
Third World, where conditions seem to be 'favourable'.
Often the definition of the problem is at stake. Resistance may oppose the
particular way a problem is 'framed' in terms of issues, themes and concerns.
Such a frame may mean a lack of choices, or present an unacceptable choice. For
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Figure 1.2. Changing expectations of the nuclear industry 1977 to 1990. The graph
shows the production and projections of nuclear power production for the year 2000
by 1977, 1980 and 1990. Source: Nuclear Industry Handbook 1992.
political decisions issues are often reduced to a binary option corresponding to the
polarities of an adversarial political system. This dichotomy is achieved in various
ways. The role of resistance may be to indicate how inadequate the binary option
is and to reopen the debate beyond the simplifying either/or. A variety of
perspectives get voiced where formerly experts dominated the debate. As an
outcome the parameters of a problem may multiply. The environmental
movement introduced a set of new criteria (environmental impacts) on existing
problems such as resource management and waste disposal. The environmental
agenda has penetrated the rhetoric of most political parties to the extent that the
movement has lost its distinct political profile; the environmental movement
becomes a victim of its own success. The success of a resistance movement may
be a condition of its dissolution.
Indirect and foreseen effects
Indirect effects are instrumental in achieving the objectives of resistance activities;
as such they are intended. Of more tactical than strategic interest are media
effects. Media coverage is important for setting the public agenda, mobilizing
public opinion and forcing governments to act (see Kepplinger, Chapter 17).
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Activities of resistance intend to be newsworthy and spectacular. Greenpeace and
anti-abortionist activities, such as chaining protesters to a tree or to furniture or
camping on the top of a chimney that pollutes the air, epitomize this quest for
publicity. Depending on how the media are taking up the issue media coverage
can be supportive or can backfire. Access to the media is important for defining an
issue for public debate. Kepplinger shows how the anti-technological movements
were able to mobilize major parts of the German press for their causes. Media
coverage is also important for recruiting new members, stabilizing a public profile
and legitimacy, gaining coalition partners, and challenging the reactions of
opponents (Schmitt-Beck 1990).
In democratic societies a referendum can be an effect of resistance, particularly
where such a procedure is not normally foreseen. The referendum on the
Austrian nuclear power plant at Zwentendorf in 1978 is such a case. The Swiss
referendum on biotechnology and reproductive technologies, part of the normal
political procedure, is analysed by Buchmann (Chapter 10). Legal regulations
set an important context for the development of new technology such as
biotechnology.
Resistance often leads to new regulations to prevent misuse of knowledge and
related practices. Getting the legal system moving, i.e. the production of new laws
or new interpretations, can be attributed to resistance, while the kind of
regulation that emerges from the process follows different constraints. Jasanoff
(Chapter 15) will show how legal traditions condition the regulatory response to
resistance to biotechnology in Germany, Britain and the USA: process versus
product regulations, or a combination of both.
Unforeseen effects
Unforeseen effects are effects of resistance on the technological process that have
not been intended nor anticipated by resistance actors. These effects share an
element of surprise for actors, as they are unexpected. The analogy of evolution
(mutation, selection and retention) on technological change (Mokyr 1992)
stipulates resistance as an external factor that selects products and processes over
time. Retrospectively these appear as lines of progression. At the time the selection
process is surprising and subject to attempts to gain control. Any present range
of technical devices and ideas is the outcome of past resistance which works as a
filter; screening out some items, letting through others, pushing the path of
'progress' into a particular direction. Technological development is at times
gradual, at times it jumps from one 'punctuated equilibrium' to the other,
depending on large-scale environmental events. Within the temporary state of
equilibrium small changes accumulate; fine tuning based on existing knowledge
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contributes massively to overall gains in productivity; revolutions from one
equilibrium to another alter the basics of design with totally new ideas.
The resistance of consumers to new products or of investors to new processes
make innovations disappear from the market. These products or processes are
retrospectively the waste of evolutionary selection. Innovative activity produces
variants of products and processes, from which consumer preferences and
investment rationales select viable ones.
Another unforeseen outcome of resistance to new technology consists of
institutional innovations and new political opportunities (Tarrow 1988). It seems
paradoxical that social innovation is attributed to a movement that resists
innovations. Resistance movements may bring new forms of political and social
negotiation that did not exist before. Procedural outcomes are new forms of
debate in new ' arenas' and with access to information that was previously not
available. Evers and Nowotny (1987, pp. 279ff) have shown how formerly
unknown technological risks are contained by new social institutions such as
insurance, technology assessment in various forms, public consultations,
hearings and other fora for public participation. However, more of a good thing
is not always better. Participatory institutions create fora for discussions between
the individual, groups, corporations and the state. Simultaneously they may
produce an overload of democratic decision-making capacity. Too many demo-
cratic proceedings tire the citizens, slow the decision process, and if a new
bureaucracy is established, institutional paralysis may be the consequence.
Once locked in a particular frame of definition, a problem may need to be
opened again to find different solutions. Institutional proceedings that close a
debate need the complement of those that open them, otherwise the social system
becomes paralysed in divisions and inactivity. The ' reinvention of politics' is
predicted for issues of new technologies (Beck 1993).
Private business contributes to institutional innovations; new forms of
consultancies emerge, dealing with risk communication, public perceptions,
public relations, and organizing fora for public debates on new technology.
Consultancies provide a kind of ' therapy'; consultants are being well paid for
telling highly unpleasant news to decision makers.
Another unforeseen effect is what social psychologists call' silent conversions',
'delayed effect' or 'sleeper effect' (Mugny & Perez 1991, p. 63). A consistent and
persistent minority will put its point across in an unexpected way. People are
changing their attitudes silently; while publicly admitting to be in favour of some
contested technology, some of these people are changing their attitude in private;
the determinants of the old attitude weaken and a sudden change becomes
possible, which will materialize during periods of public debate. For a consistent
minority the potential support is often much larger than is publicly visible.
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In the nuclear debate resistance managed to raise the safety standards to higher
levels than were ever envisaged by the nuclear industry. The industry, by
complying with safety standards to render nuclear power more acceptable, incurs
increasing costs. Safety expectations in the public have increased the costs of
building, running and waste disposal for nuclear power plants to an extent that
makes its economic viability doubtful in competition with other energy sources
(see Rucht, Chapter 13). In 1980 the unit costs of nuclear power generated
electricity had risen to 571% of the 1968 level (Radkau 1983, p. 585). The
recalculation of the economic rationale of nuclear power is at least in part due to
the public scrutiny of anti-nuclear movements and its effects on public
expectations and government regulations.
Social differentiation is an unforeseen effect of resistance. In taking part in a
controversy on new technology public opinion is likely to polarize along the lines
of that controversy if the issue is kept in the public eye for long enough. The
segmentation of opinions and attitudes in social and geographical space may cut
right across traditional lines of social differentiation, such as political party
affiliation, religion, social class or income, as the environmental movement has
shown. The alignment that anti-technology movements have introduced into
Western societies in the last 2 5 years defies an explanation in terms of economic
categories such as income or property ownership.
The paradox of resistance is that it may increase the rate and the depth of
change. Crozier (1963) argued that bureaucratic institutions change in a
cycle of cataclysms. Periods of small or no changes alternate with periods of
fundamental upheaval. This may lead to the effect that the total rate of change
and its range may be higher than otherwise. A similar characteristic of
scientific progress was suggested by Kuhn (1962, p. 64) who observed that
'normal science' leads to a refinement of instruments and concepts and to
institutional rigidity which will be shaken more fundamentally the more
rigid it is. In the catastrophe model of organizational change by Bigelow
(1982), resistance is the splitting factor that creates the cusp of unpredicta-
bility in the system. Depending on the degree of resistance in a system, the
rate of change will be gradual or unpredictable. The linear correlation between
forces for change and resulting changes becomes chaotic with high levels
of resistance in the system. Resistance leads to abrupt, unpredictable and
hence uncontrollable changes in a system. From the point of view of interest
in fundamental change, resistance in the system is ultimately conducive to
innovation.
Recursive effects of resistance actions
An outcome of any action is to inform future actions of a similar kind. All the
effects previously discussed are contributions to the socio-technical process of
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which resistance is a subprocess; recursive effects strengthen or weaken the
viability of future resistance. It makes sense to conceive the interaction of social
actors, innovators and resistance as a learning process of structural change.
Protest is its own school, and resistance feeds on past resistance for strategy,
tactics, cognition, motivation, and its cultural basis (see Randall, Chapter 3).
Conceptually one may argue that we are not dealing with social analogies -
different social processes that solve similar problems - of resistance across
technologies, but with social homologies - social processes that are similar due to
common origin and tradition.
Resistance activity provides a social identity and fosters social cohesion.
Scattered individuals or small groups merge in a larger network with an image
and awareness of themselves in contrast to others, giving social significance to
their members. The post-war history of European nations provides many
examples: national identities are redefined based on the experience of resistance
against fascism and Soviet-Russian hegemony. The experience and practice of
resistance provides the bridge to span the gap between political parties and their
ideological divisions, and locks them into an historic consensus (Wippermann
1983). As soon as the memory of that common resistance fades away, the
structure that is built on it weakens, and the post-war political system is in crisis.
Official recognition is another recursive effect of resistance. An initially
marginal core actor may gain official recognition to speak for the people in
resistance. This legitimation has an internal and an external dynamic. Internally
several actors and factions may compete for leadership; the external recognition
of leadership may solve at least temporarily an internal conflict. The legitimation
of leadership may provide a distinct profile, direction, coordination and
personalized image of its causes. Personalization of ideas is important to obtain
effective media coverage. A representative can join the formal political process in
parliament or in commissions to negotiate face-to-face with other parties. On the
other hand the basis of leadership is fragile as the increasing distance between
figurehead, formal organization and grassroots may undermine its legitimacy
(the iron law of oligarchy). The fate of the German Green movement, torn
between basic democracy ('Fundis') and political effectiveness {'Realos') tells a
story in that respect. A similar story is told about Greenpeace, where the increased
attempt to legitimize claims by invoking scientific research and authority opens
up the gap between the leadership of the movement and its basis, and undermines
the basis of the movement (Yearley 1992).
Motivational effects need to be taken into account. Motivation describes the
processes of beginning, ending, and sustaining resistance activity in the face of
difficulties. Media coverage, favourable or unfavourable, provides a public profile
and identity, which is likely to strengthen the social cohesion and determination
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of collective action. Success in some geographic location against a particular
technological development may increase the determination and confidence of the
actors involved, and by the spread of news stimulate actors in other areas.
Repression deters people from action, but may increase the determination of a
small group of actors to go underground and to fight with all means available,
which may lead to extremism and to violence.
Measuring effects of resistance
Several measures of effect that are used in empirical research will be discussed in
this volume. Rucht (Chapter 13) and Rudig (1991) estimate the rate of completion
of national nuclear power programmes by comparing the status quo, current
plans and initial plans of energy capacity. The difference between plan and reality
after the occurrence of resistance is an index of its effect. Similarly projected
figures of future (past futures) production of nuclear energy measure the changing
expectations of the industry in reaction to resistance. The number of orders of
nuclear power plants cancelled is another index of effect. However, the link
between these effect measures and resistance requires detailed case analysis,
because contingencies other than popular resistance influence the development
of the nuclear industry.
Content analysis of media coverage measures the attention that resistance
activities mobilize, favourable and unfavourable, for their causes. Media coverage
is a crucial inroad to study social reality, because of the central role of media in
reducing the complexity of modern reality for the citizens. What, to what extent,
and how resistance is covered, are basic data for measuring the effects of
resistance on public discussion. Intensity measures allow us to assess the strength
and the structure of the 'resistance signal' and to relate it to the changes in the
technological process. Time series data are essential for this purpose.
Another source of measures is diffusion research. Resistance in a system will
lead to clusters of innovations in certain regions (Hagerstrand 1967). The degree
of regional disparity, the number of clusters, and their size may be taken as
indicators of the effect of resistance. Delays in the timing of the take-off of a
diffusion process, and the rate of diffusion are indicators of resistance to innovation
in a social system (Botelho, Chapter 11).
An overview of the book
The contributions to this book are grouped into five parts to compare resistance
and its effects according to several criteria: comparisons by (a) time, between
historical events before 1945 and after 1945, (b) across different technologies in
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the post-war period; and (c) cross-national. This three-dimensional grid of
comparisons shows the complexity within which one attempts to generalize
empirical findings; abstraction may prove to be more promising than induction.
The first part of the book introduces conceptual issues of resistance. Alain
Touraine (Paris, France) opens up a wide horizon with reflections upon the origins
of the present' crisis of progress' and the modern dilemma of universal rationality
and particular identities: we still believe in science but no longer in ' Progress'
writ large. The progress of science brought the rise of' big science',' te< "mocracy'
and, dialectically, of anti-technocratic attitudes. He pleads for an ^tension of
democracy to bridge the increasing gap between functionally differentiated social
activities. Adrian Randall (Birmingham, UK) presents a detailed reassessment of
three forms of Luddite resistance and their impacts on the early nineteenth
century English textile industry: strike, violence and appeal to authority. His
historiographical comments situate traditional views of 'Luddism' in Whiggish
accounts of technological progress and labour history. Dancker Daamen and Ivo
van der Lans (Leiden, Netherlands) discuss the measurement problem of' context
effects'. In measuring present-day resistance with surveys questioning public atti-
tudes to technology, we incur measurement effects. The way we sequence survey
questions in questionnaires and interviews affects significantly the results of the
survey. The 'assimilation effect' is demonstrated and strategies to increase the
validity of such survey data are discussed. Finally, Bauer (London, UK) will trace
the periodic revival of the concept of' technophobia' to assess people's reaction to
new technology. Cyberphobia epitomizes the clinical view of resistance which
attributes a pathological deficit to the computer non-user. We may more usefully
conceive resistance as a signal of the mismatch of expectations between users and
designers. With data from a study I show how this resistance signal affects a
software development project over eight years in a Swiss Bank. I shall develop this
idea of a 'signal' in the last chapter on the functionality of resistance.
Part II brings together five national and regional studies to show the historical
diversity of resistance in form and effect. Kristine Bruland (Oslo, Norway) shows
how, in the context of nineteenth century Scandinavia, resistance to new
technology is not confined to labour. Governments, regional administrators, civil
servants and industrialists have vested interests in old technologies. Long-term
conflicts over new technologies in Scandinavia concern new fishing nets and the
introduction of the steam saw in the timber industry. The private automobile in
Norway and nuclear energy in Sweden are examples of public resistance forcing
a selection on the technological process in the twentieth century. Staudenmaier
(MIT, United States) shows how the name' Ford' evokes images which are equally
ambiguous as Henry Ford's personal reaction to his own achievements. Ford
himself, in his later years indulging in an idyllic escapism while simultaneously
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bringing his technological visions to a climax, exemplifies the ambiguity with
which humans confront technology. Roy MacLeod (Sydney, Australia) unfolds a
narrative of the Australian debate on nuclear issues: of 'Nuclear Knights', of the
official secrecy, of international relations, and of the resistance from various
sources that to date has prevented nuclear power from producing a significant
amount of energy on that continent. Roderick Martin (Glasgow, UK) recalls the
first round of industrial conflict on the introduction of new computer based
production technology in Fleet Street, London, where, between 1975 and 1980,
highly unionized staff successfully resisted attempts to introduce computerized
photocomposition. This was possible because neither proprietors nor unions were
united in their strategies. New ownership and new industrial relations were
capable of implementing the new technology ten years later. He discusses the
functional role of resistance in 'voicing' issues that are neglected. Finally, Marlis
Buchmann (Zurich, Switzerland) analyses voting behaviour in a Swiss referen-
dum, where in May 1992 the electorate decided upon the legal framework for
biotechnology and reproductive technology. A public debate gave strong signals
to interested institutions and expressed the relevant concerns. Survey data show
that supporters of the new regulations, young, urban and well educated, express
a value pattern of 'limited progress' which is different from the 1950s'
unconditional quest for modernization.
Part in compares resistance to a new technology across different countries and
shows how both the occurrence of resistance and its effects are contingent upon
contexts. Antonio Botelho (MIT, United States) analyses the diffusion of
semiconductor technology until the mid-1960s in France and Japan. Resistance
in the diffusion process is the product of a political arena where the state,
industry and professional cultures meet. He unravels how France and Japan
differentiate their involvement in the semi-conductor industry despite similar
starting positions in 1945. Miles and Thomas (Manchester and London, UK)
show how resistance manifests itself in the context of information technology
such as videotex and audiotex with differential success rates in France, Germany
and the United Kingdom. They order recent developments of interactive
information technologies and distinguish forms of consumer resistance to explain
the relative failure of videotex in Britain. They discuss the effectiveness of UK
regulatory bodies in voicing concerns on behalf of the public. Moving to
nuclear power, Dieter Rucht (Berlin, Germany) reviews the history of anti-
nuclear resistance and presents an elaborate attempt to assess both resistance and
its effects across sixteen countries. The strength and effectiveness of anti-nuclear
resistance varies around the world. The emerging picture is complex. The effects
of resistance on nuclear policy are contingent upon economic contexts, the
way political decisions are made, and the attitudes of elites in different countries.
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On new biotechnology, Robert Bud (London, UK) reviews the actions of various
government agencies in Japan, Europe and the USA between 1970 and 1986.
Trying to accommodate both public concerns and industrial interests, different
concepts of biotechnology are promoted at different times. An undercurrent of
public distrust survives all regulations and may resurface with new issues such as
the human genome project. Jasanoff (Cornell, United States) compares the legal
cultures of the USA, the UK and Germany and shows how they accommodate the
risks of new biotechnology in different ways. She identifies three paradigms of
control - product, process and programme - as contingent forms of public
reassurance with regard to physical, social and political risks. Forms and effects
of public resistance are both contingent upon these cultural contexts. The
definition of what is ' new' is at the heart of the matter.
Part IV compares resistance across different technologies in one country and
explores the problems of drawing analogies between technologies. Joachim
Radkau (Bielefeld, Germany) compares the debate on nuclear power and biotech-
nology in Germany with a stage model and discusses the 'risks' of the analogy by
risk. Nuclear power and biotechnology have mobilized the German Green Party;
a parliamentary commission on new biotechnology preferred analogies with
information technology to analogies between nuclear power and biotechnology.
Both the risks and the chances associated with these developments require a more
calm and more critical assessment. Hans-Mathias Kepplinger (Mainz, Germany)
compares the press coverage of nuclear power and biotechnology in Germany and
its institutional context. The long-term trend towards critical commentary on
new technology seems to bear out a paradox: attention and negative attitudes
increase while actual damage decreases. This is explained with a two-culture
model where the scientific and technological elite confronts a ' reflective-elite' of
literary and social scientific provenence. The mentality of the reflective elite
changes the culture of journalism to a focus on 'negative' events. The agenda
setting function of some newspapers for public opinion is assessed quantitatively.
Dorothy Nelkin (New York, United States) finally compares information tech-
nology and biotechnology in the USA by their impact on people's privacy. She
equally points to the contradiction between real impact and actual concern.
Information technology, more intrusive into privacy than biotechnology, does
not mobilize as much public concern. This contradiction reveals the hierarchy of
values and exposes a gap between rhetoric and reality in American society. What
makes people move are health risks, organized interests and religious agendas,
while lip service is paid to the protection of privacy, freedom and democracy.
In Part V, Bauer will attempt to integrate the various contributions with the
help of the ' pain analogy' of resistance by abstracting from various contexts:
resistance is a signal that things go wrong. Resistance works as the ' acute pain'
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of the technological process. Social system theory provides the framework to
elaborate the self-monitoring functions of resistance: it allocates attention,
evaluates and alters the technological progress. Resistance is primarily a
functional process that is constituted in communication about it; dysfunctions
are likely, but are secondary. Several implications for research on resistance
within socio-technical progress are suggested: the analysis of resistance shifts
from causes to effects; and to the analysis of the symbolic encoding of events over
long time periods and in the contexts of activity systems.
Notes
1 Many of the following ideas were developed during discussions at the conference workshop on
7 April 1993.1 would like to express thanks to the many contributors, equally to Jane Gregory,
George Gaskell, Sandra Jovchelovitch and Alan Morton for helpful comments on the chapter.
However, I take full responsibility for the way ideas are presented here.
2 For a view of the managerial bias in the resistance literature in the Lewin tradition which I
described as the 'forced feeding paradigm' see Bauer (1991, 1993); for a sharp critique of
notions of resistance in modernization theory see Reverendi (1975).
3 Other comparisons were suggested: compulsory vaccination was withdrawn on public
demand in Britain in 1907 after 37 years of resistance. Mazur (1975) has compared public
resistance to fluoridation of water and to nuclear power in the USA. Mazlish (1965) explored
analogies between railway building in the 19 th century and the space programme in the
1960s with regard to social impact.
4 The debate on the empirical evidence for and the explanation of these cycles continues
(Freeman 1984; Hall 1988). I use the idea of long waves descriptively to demarcate periods
of historical events (van Roon 1981).
5 I assume that the OECD reports on particular developments indicate the timing of the giving of
political attention by key member states to significant new developments; some states may
have identified the issue earlier at a national level and drawn the attention of others through
the OECD activity. For example, the German DECHEMA report on biotechnology dates back to
1974 and may have served as an international agenda setter (see Bud, Chapter 14).
6 I disregard here earlier reports on microprocessor developments in 1961, and on the
automation debate in the 1950s and 1960s. These issues were temporary concerns which did
not initiate a continuous focus of attention.
7 'New materials' are often being identified as a new base technology, but they do not give
rise to public debate, nor to Utopian images of future societies such as the 'nuclear society',
the 'information society', or the 'biosociety'.
8 Strictly speaking the demonstration of this serial media attention would require data from one
single country; however, longitudinal data on all three issues are not available from any one
country. One can expect that countries peak in different years, but the overall series in Figure
1.1 remains the same in the light of the available evidence. We are collecting comparative
longitudinal data on press coverage of all three technologies in Britain between 1945 and the
present, but the data are not ready yet (for preliminaries see Bauer 1994).
9 The coverage of nuclear power issues went beyond the 1979 peak to cover the Chernobyl
disaster in 1985. For evidence of an international peak of nuclear power news in 1979, see
Saxer et al. (1986, p. 169) for Switzerland; for the USA see Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p.
17); also Mazur (1984, p. 106), who indexed articles on 'nuclear power plants'; Weart (1988,
p. 387) finds the news peak on civil nuclear power four years earlier in 1975 by following the
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keywords 'atomic', 'nuclear' and 'radioactivity'. Weart equally shows an earlier peak in
coverage on civil nuclear power in 1955 and 1956. Contrary to the late 1970s, the discussion
in the 1950s was mainly in a positive tone.
10 Back in 1963 an American journalist working in London, Harvey Matusov, founded the
' International Society for the Fight Against Data Processing Machines' (ISFADPM) with the aim' to
destruct man's overdependence on the computer' (1968, p. 7). Matusov (1968) published a
record of computer atrocities. At the end of the book he lists a series of 'guerilla warfare' tips
to confuse and challenge data processing machines; on request the ISFADPM would send more
detailed instructions. How far this was a spoof or a serious endeavour is difficult to reconstruct
without further evidence about the society's activity.
11 The topical distribution of public opinion surveys may be another indicator of public concern.
To establish an inventory of such surveys across different countries is a topic for future
research. See Jaufmann & Kistler (1986) for an international secondary analysis of public
opinion on information technology. They managed to diffuse the idea of a particular syndrome
of' Technikfeindschaft' (technophobia) in Germany by international comparison.
12 In fact the British judge, John Presser QC, has rejected a claim for compensation for RSI,
declaring that the term RSI was ' meaningless' and ' had no place in the medical dictionary'
(The Independent, 23 November 1993).
13 On such visions of nuclear power as a mobile source of energy for various small-scale purposes,
see Radkau (1983, pp. 791) in his discussion of the 'nuclear myths' of the 1950s.
14 This idea is taken from the discussion of what constitutes' resistance' in the context of Fascism
and National Socialism in Germany (Kershaw 1985, p. 781).
15 In the discussion on resistance against Nazism in Germany, a functional definition had the
effect of shifting the focus of research from ' elite groups' and a few spectacular events to more
widespread daily forms of non-conformism, which demonstrated the diverse ways in which
limits were set to a horrendous political project. The symbolic significance and real effects
of such actions remain controversial (Kershaw 1985, p. 780).
16 The resistance of 18th century French peasants as well as of present day Malaysian farmers to
tax demands of central government is silent, and neither coordinated nor self-conscious as
Scott (1985) has described in his Weapons of the Weak.
17 Newspapers have recently reported violent attacks on research institutions in the USA. Letter
bombs seriously injured Carles Epstain, at Berkeley University, and exploded in the Computer
Centre at Yale University. The FBI stresses that this is likely to be the act of an individual (e.g.
The Guardian, 25 June 1993; NZZ, 26 June 1993). In Britain some scientists receive police
protection due to threats from animal protection terrorists.
18 Psychotherapists call this 'interactional resistance' (Petzold 1981).
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